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Abstract: Located within a broad appraisal of Nigeria’s nascent democracy, this paper examined the
roots and triggers of radical Islam and religious extremism in Northern Nigeria. It also investigated
its implication in the region through the lenses of religion and politics. Since 1804, a tradition
of jihadist Islam in the north, introduced by Sheikh Uthman dan Fodio, has shaped not only the
politics of the region but has festered into modern-day insurgency. This radicalism enthroned an
intolerant, anti-Western and violent Islamic ideology used against minorities within and against
other religions, ethno-regional groups, and political blocs in Nigeria. What exactly are the triggers
of religious violence in today’s Northern Nigeria? Furthermore, if any, what are the implications
for this region? Drawing on archival materials and secondary sources, findings reveal deep-seated,
anti-southern sentiments in the north, complicated by religious, cultural, and economic suspicions,
whipped up at political intersections. Evidence also indicates significant leadership failures. This
internal complexity holds back Northern Nigeria’s overall economic and social modernisation pace.
This paper recommends state-sponsored awareness campaigns that emphasise diversity, integration
and unity. To overcome insurgency, politics must deliver dividends of democracy to all. Governance
must become a means to economic ends and not an end in itself.
Keywords: violence; politics; religion; Northern Nigeria; African democracy
1. Introduction
Northern Nigeria is resource-rich but politically volatile and economically depressed
(Hoffmann 2013). Extremist groups and militant insurgents have caused immense destruc-
tion of lives and properties across the region. In the northeast, Boko Haram—an Islamic
fundamentalist group formed in 2009—has transmuted into the most devastating threat
to national security in Nigeria. According to the United Nations Refugee Agency (2018),
Boko Haram insurgency has claimed the lives of over a million people, displacing nearly
3.3 million inhabitants of the Lake Chad Basin, and dislocating over 2.5 million persons
across north-eastern Nigeria. The connectedness of today’s globalised world has allowed
local extremists groups such as Boko Haram to graft themselves into universalised debates
on Muslim resistance to Western hegemony (Crisis Group 2016). Sporadic violence in Kano,
Kaduna and Zamfara states also indicates that the north is unpredictably dangerous and
fundamentally underdeveloped. Conflict-induced food insecurity, limited access to basic
amenities, a fragile economy and environmental challenges not only threaten the stability
of the region and its people, but also challenge the integrity of the Nigerian state.
However, with a landmass approximately two-thirds of Nigeria and twice the size
of Germany, yet rich in natural solid minerals with huge agricultural potential, states
in northern Nigeria ought to be economically self-sufficient and politically stable. Ad-
ditionally, a long established, precolonial economy, built around commerce and trade
as far as North Africa (evidenced during Trans-Saharan trade) and developed on sound
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pre-independence economic policies that prioritised agriculture, banking, trade, infrastruc-
ture and industrialisation should today make the north economically self-sustaining and
competitive. Furthermore, Nigeria is Africa’s largest economy by Gross Domestic Product
(GDP), Africa’s largest single market and the continent’s biggest democracy. In the last two
decades, democratic consolidation and increased GDP derived from oil revenue provided
the Nigerian government with robust resources to transform the economy of northern
Nigeria, upgrade its infrastructure and close the development gap between the north and
the more economically viable south (National Bureau of Economic Research 2007). More
importantly, states in the north have benefitted significantly more from Nigeria’s Federa-
tion Account than other states by reason of Nigeria’s fiscal policy, adopted in 1988. Based
on the north’s population (over 90 million of Nigeria’s estimated 200 million inhabitants),
geography (60% of Nigeria’s total landmass), higher number of states (19 out of 36) and
more local governments (426 of 774), the current revenue allocation formula disproportion-
ately allows more resources to flow northwards. Nevertheless, these historical, economic,
and political advantages are yet to modernise the region or its people (National Bureau of
Economic Research 2007). “Despite vast mineral resources, democratic consolidation and
targeted state investment, northern Nigeria still faces its worst civil and economic situation
since independence” (Moghalu 2019).
The volatility and complexity of challenges confronting the region make prescribing
policy interventions extremely difficult. Yet, overcoming the north’s considerable problems
relating to politics, education, development, and security is crucial to the realisation of a
shared and prosperous future for Nigeria. To address the development deficit between
the north and the more prosperous south, as well as create an enabling environment
in the north, a good starting point is to provide contextual understanding of religious
intolerance in the north and argue that transformation from political and ideological
structures that perpetuate poverty towards industrialisation and economic development
demands recalibrating the politics of the region to tolerate others and emulate sound
governance and economic best practices (Khan and Chen 2016).
2. Religion and Political Violence—A Theoretical Framework
Interest in the intersection of religion, politics, and violence, mostly treated separately
until two decades ago, was brought into sharp focus after 11 September terrorist attacks
on major financial and government institutions in the United States of America. That
attack and many more that followed in Spain, France, the United Kingdom and other
major European capitals are rooted in the re-emergence of politically active and extremist
forms of religious groups that use religion as a rallying force to address, confront and
challenge global developments and, in some cases, local socioeconomic trends. Since
9/11, the dimensions of political conflict and social upheavals with religious undertones
have increased to alarming proportions globally in general and locally in Africa (U.S.
Counterterrorism Centre 2013). In the River Chad area that integrates Nigeria, Cameroon,
Chad and Niger, the Boko Haram insurgency group continues to wreak havoc across the
region as it seeks to establish an Islamic state in West Africa. Across Somalia, Kenya and
East Africa, the Al Shabab terror group is a constant threat to regional security as it attempts
to destabilise and overthrow the government of Somalia as well as retaliate against regional
neighbours (such as Kenya) for their military aid to Somalia. Al Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb is another insurgent group in Africa, operating around Northern Mali with a
mission to create an Islamic kingdom in North Africa (U.S. Counterterrorism Centre 2013).
To explore the relationship between religion and political violence, Brubaker (2015)
outlined two possible connections: one, a particularising view that religion is important,
perhaps too important, in understanding and dealing with life. This view finds support
in Ter Haar’s (2005) argument that religion is a complex phenomenon and difficult to
define precisely and that religious ideologies are deeply ingrained. These ideologies are
drawn from sacred texts and teachings of inspirational leaders. Such teachings, overtime,
become shared values and norms (predominant in Islam and Judaism), legitimised by
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a transcendental source and are hardly subject to negotiation and compromise, given
their accepted supernatural origin (Horowitz 2009). Brubaker further asserts that in many
traditions of serious or demanding religiosity, personal, social, and political issues are
viewed through the lenses of right or wrong and good or bad. As such, force or conflict,
particularly in Islam, is seen as inevitable in upholding or restoring the “right” order of
things on the one hand, while on the other hand, conflict is used to suppress or expel what
they consider “wrong”. Conflict in Islam “turns on the question of how we should live, not
just questions of recognition, resources and opportunities for cultural reproduction that
are central to politicized ethnicity” but also existential questions about life, living and the
future (Isak and Harding 2011). The 1979 Iranian revolution is an example of how extreme
Islamic views can impose radicalism on politics, education, and society. Another example
is the rise in extreme conservative movements in the United States that seek to ban abortion,
prohibit gay marriages, restore prayer to schools and restrict access to contraceptives in a
liberal democracy with constitutionally guaranteed, protected human rights.
The other view is a generalising standpoint. It asserts that what appears to be reli-
giously inspired violence or conflict is “best subsumed under political conflict or under the
abstract rubric of politicised ethnicity. Through this view, religious claims may mask other,
more important causal factors; religion is at best incidental to the logic or causal texture
of the conflict or violence” (Brubaker 2015). This latter view suggests that religion is one
among other causal factors, mostly used for mobilisation and legitimacy. Like ethnicity,
language and race, religion is used as a means to an end and not an end in itself. More
often than not, political mobilisers use existing religious sentiments or racial prejudice or
ethnic differences as tools through which political (and not religious, racial or ethnic) ends
are achieved. This is referred to as the politicisation or weaponisation of religion for non-
religious purposes (Allan 1985). Many examples buttress the point above—conflicts over
economic resources, political power, national self-determination, and cultural resistance
employ religion for mobilisation (Basedau et al. 2011). In Northern Ireland, parties of the
conflict are often identified as Catholics and Protestants, but both sides are ardent followers
of the doctrines of Christ. Crisis in Belfast is not fundamentally about religious doctrines
but about nationalism, social justice, and marginalisation. The same can be said of Shiites
and Sunnis in Iraq and Alawits and Sunnis in Syria.
A third explanation that links religion to violence was propounded by Gregg (2014)
who grouped together suicide bombers, Christian Apocalypse, millennialism, and jihadi
warriors. “Religious adherents engage in apocalyptic war because they believe that it will
hasten the apocalypse, a practice known as “catastrophic Messianism.” Apocalyptic war
occurs when adherents believe that current-day events are signs that the end is here, and
that their participation in the Final Battle is necessary for both Good to triumph and for
their own eternal salvation” (Gregg 2014).
Although not every form of religiosity is violent, studies show that some religious
organisations have certain characteristics that give them the capacity to weaken the ideas
of human commonality and, in some cases, destabilise civil society (Polson 2008). Across
the world, religion and religious identity are intertwined in ethnic, political, economic, and
social controversies, and can be misused by politicians, clerics, extreme religious leaders,
or others to rouse their constituencies for gain.
3. Religion and Ethnicity in Nigeria—A Review of Literature
Nigeria is Africa’s most populous nation, with over 206 million inhabitants (United
Nations Population Fund 2020). Demographically, the country is divided in two by geogra-
phy, culture and religion. The North, comprising of 19 out of 36 states, is predominantly
Muslim, integrated into Middle Eastern culture and Arabic civilisation, and peopled by the
Hausa/Fulani ethnic group. The South, on the other hand, is cosmopolitan, Christian, and
heavily influenced by Western culture (Akinyemi and Isiugo-Abanihe 2014). In precolonial
times, both regions were autonomous and independent; however, in 1914, administrative
efficiency necessitated the British colonial government to amalgamate both halves into a
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single political entity—Nigeria. Although colonial Nigeria was governed as one, signifi-
cant cultural and other differences persisted and manifested progressively as nationalist
leaders from the north and south pushed for decolonisation and self-rule in the 1950s. By
1960, when political independence was achieved, both halves were unequal politically,
educationally, socially, culturally, and economically (Ikime 1999). The south was at an
advantage and as a consequence, relations in the newly emergent nation were strained by
mutual suspicion and ethnic competition. In post-independence Nigeria, the concentration
and influence of Christianity and Islam in the south and north, respectively, have had a
significant impact on every aspect of Nigeria’s political, economic, and social life—religion
continues to shape identity, opportunities, and politics. This review looked specifically at
the nexus of religion and politics in northern Nigeria.
More than any other region, the north of Nigeria has witnessed more religion-inspired
conflicts than elsewhere in West Africa (U.S. Dept. of State 2016). Some major religion-
inspired conflicts include: Boko Haram insurgency—an anti-West militant organisation
that began in 2009 and continues to destabilise Nigeria’s northeast geopolitical zone.
The Miss World Competition Riot in 2002, during which violence erupted when most
Muslims opposed the planned hosting of a beauty competition in Abuja, categorising it
as immoral in the holy month of Ramadan. At least 100 people were killed while many
Christian Churches were burnt (Human Rights Watch 2003). The Zaki-Biam conflict in
2001 between the Jukun and the Fulanis on the one hand, and the Tivs against Fulanis
on the other, for which about 22 soldiers were ambushed and killed near the town of
Vaase. The discovery of 19 bodies of soldiers in Zaki-Biam resulted in a brutal reprisal from
the Federal Government, which left about 300 civilians dead while seven villages were
completely destroyed (Obi-Ani 2008). Solidarity with Afghanistan in October 2001 led to
days of violence and counter-violence in Northern Nigeria, as radical Muslims opposed
US bombardment of Afghanistan following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in New
York. The Kaduna Sharia crisis of 2000 saw the unwarranted death of about 2000 people in
the state after the introduction of Sharia Law. Violence between Tivs and Azeris in May
2001 in Nasarawa State left over 50,000 people homeless, and many dead. The Zango-Kataf
crisis in 1992 left over 1000 Hausa-Fulani dead after a religious conflict escalated due to
vandalism of a yam farm belonging to Christian farmers of the Kataf people. In 1990, at
Bauchi, 10 secondary schools were attacked over allegations of water wastage, leading to
the loss of five lives with about a hundred seriously wounded (Punch Editorial 2018).
Long-standing “anti-others” sentiment in the north runs deep. It began in 1804 when
Usman Dan Fodio waged a holy war (Jihad) against un-Islamic and “corrupt” ruling elites.
An immediate aftermath of that Jihad was the establishment of Sokoto Caliphate—an
institutionalised and centralised Islamic state built on religious and political authority
(Isak and Harding 2011). The 1804 Sokoto Jihad united, under a single religiopolitical
structure and single language, most city states that occupy present-day northern Nigeria.
The south, on the other hand, to a large extent is multi-faith, multi-ethnic and metropolitan
(Nmah and Amanambu 2017). Colonial rule politics complicated relations between the two
regions, particularly from 1914. Preference for and preservation of Islam in the north due
to its structural alignment with the colonial enterprise encouraged the British to restrict the
spread of Western education and Christian missions to the north. For the entire duration
of the colonial project, an unofficial policy of religious segregation kept the regions apart.
Within the north, non-Muslims were made to live in separate parts of town (Sabongari),
away from Muslims. Towards and after independence, the north continued to project
itself as a single, united, politico-religious region, in spite of the presence of non-Muslims
in increasing numbers. This was evidenced in 1979 when attempts were made during
the constitution drafting phase to make Sharia a national legal code. If colonial rulers
had nipped segregation in the bud, conflict may have been less sporadic in modern-day
Nigeria.
Colonialism and independence may have necessitated amalgamation and nationhood,
but religious, educational, and ideological divergence remained in place to the extent
Religions 2021, 12, 888 5 of 15
that post-independent political parties were structured along regional and religious lines.
During Nigeria’s Second Republic (1979–1984), the two main political parties—National
Party of Nigeria (NPN—with roots in the North) and Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN—with
roots in the South)—dominated the political scene. NPN fielded Muslim northerners as
candidates and UPN presented Christian southerners. In the same vein, the aborted Third
Republic (1993) had two parties—the National Republican Convention (NRC) and the
Social Democratic Party (SDP). Both parties were a recast of the NPN/UPN structure of
the previous republic.
Three decades ago, Osaghae (1988) argued that the state was unable to change the
perceptions and attitudes of society because the state is itself guided by the same codes
and, therefore, reaps the huge benefit of political privileges from them. Data analysis
presented in this paper shows that these conditions persist and have been entrenched over
time. Strong links between elites and their use of religion as a legitimising instrument
have endured to the extent that they combine to shape politics and state policies in Nigeria.
Elections in the north are not defined by policies or performance but by the religion of
the contestants (Mayah et al. 2017). The character of the state—human rights, separation
of power, rule of law, elections, party system, policies and reforms, decentralisation,
public/private partnership, power relations—is shaped by the government in power and
their ethnoreligious leaning.
More than any other region, the north’s political environment is a defined elite politi-
cal culture, grounded in politicisation of religion, leading to violent aggression towards
minorities. (Bauhn 1989). These observations underscore elite political culture as a con-
sistent phenomenon in the development and sustenance of organised political schema, in
which violence serves as a means to an end. This point serves as a framework through
which political culture fosters sustained resentment towards others (Seiyefa 2016). Religion
has become an instrument of wresting for political power. Aspects of this contestation,
especially the role of religious leaders and institutions in the democratic space, are by no
means unique to Nigeria but the violence and conflict that surges prior to election, during
voting and after election results are announced are significantly higher in the north than
elsewhere across democracies in Africa.
Basedau et al. (2011) argued that certain religious structures such as parallel ethnic
and religious identities or changing religious demographics are prone to mobilisation in
politics; once politicised, violent conflict becomes likelier. The essence of Boko Haram and
the philosophy that they preach is unique to the above theory. This is especially so in the
context of religions’ new political weaponisation. Religion may not only incite violence
but also contribute to peace (Appleby 2000; Philpott 2007). Evidence suggests that the
spate of violent crises that erupted in recent years in the north and along the Middle Belt
region have religious, ethnic and sectarian colouring and have impacted negatively on
both economic and human developments (Sunday Bobai Agang 2011; Loimeier 2012).
4. Materials and Methods
To investigate the triggers of religious conflict in northern Nigeria as well as its
implications, if any, a qualitative methodological approach was used. This is especially
appropriate for interpreting, describing, gaining in-depth insight, and contextualising the
question of religion, politics and violence in the north. Further justification for a qualitative
method, according to Braun and Clarke (2006), is its ability to generate knowledge on
“how” and “why” questions based on the experience, opinions, and account of participants.
In order to gain deeper insight into the research questions, existing data were used as
the principal method of information collection. Data from peer-reviewed journal publica-
tions, books and newspaper articles proved most useful. Newspaper articles in national
dailies in Nigeria such as The Guardian (15), Punch (15) and THISDAY (10) (listed in the
Appendix A section) documented the daily occurrence of developments within the north
and across Nigeria deemed relevant to the research questions. Articles that explored the
“how”, “what” and “why” questions were purposely selected for analysis. Books and
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journal materials on their part provided historical analysis and thematic frameworks on
the nexus between politics and religion and how they shaped violence and social relations
in northern Nigeria. Justification for this method was informed by two important reasons:
(1) Access to the north in general is limited due to restrictions imposed by the Federal
Government based on COVID-19. (2) Volatility within the north due to sensitivity of
religion (Islam) created safety concerns during the design phase of the research.
Qualitative content analysis used, followed by an existing yet strict methodological
guide (Elo and Kyngas 2008). Familiarity with the gathered content was first established
before coding sections of text into meaningful units. These were then discussed by the
research team and developed into broader thematic categories. Subcategories were devel-
oped into how the subjects of “trigger” and “implications” were explored. What followed
was a description of each category for context and meaning, particularly as they relate
to research objectives. A main advantage of qualitative content analysis is its ability to
simplify and reduce data into categories
Existing data produced results that can be generalised beyond the sample. They
also provided a more in-depth understanding of the motivation, history, triggers and
implication of violence in northern Nigeria. The risk of exposure to volatility, uncertainty
and health concerns was mitigated with the use of secondary sources. Additionally,
an extensive pool of existing literature was available, from which the study benefited
immensely. A key obstacle that presented itself during data gathering was the abundance
of data in newspapers. To alleviate this, only national newspapers were selected and only
articles that probed into how and why were selectively analysed (Mason 1996).
5. Analysis
5.1. Interrogating the Roots of Intolerance and Violence in Nigeria
Multiple factors account for religious intolerance and violence in Nigeria. These
include: weak co-operation among the constituting part of the federation; distrust along
the lines of ethnicity, religion, class, and creed; the cycle of poverty; inconsistency of the
federal government in handling ethnic-related issues; lack of education; and manipulative
agenda of the powerful elite. These factors create a fertile soil in which conflict and
violence have erupted and could break out at any point in time. Additionally, militant
groups such as Boko Haram, Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND),
Niger Delta militants, Oodua People’s Congress (OPC), and the Egbesu Boys have become
grim precursors of conflict and violence across the nation.
Since 1999, bottled-up political frustrations such as ethnic marginalisation, suppressed
during the long and dark decades of military rule exploded from all parts of the federation—
in the north, the introduction of Sharia law; in the southwest and the Niger-Delta, multiple
ethnic groups and movements—some violent, others less-aggressive—all sought to address
perceived and real oppression. In the Middle Belt, confrontations over landownership
and power became a perennial problem (Obi-Ani 2008). These conflicts centred mainly
on legitimation of power, how order prevails in society through force or dialogue, and
definitions of social classes in the context of material interest. These observations by Weber
three decades ago are still apt in describing roots of intolerance in Nigeria (Weber 1978).
Conflict is thus created when groups attempt or succeed in carrying out their will by
overcoming the resistance of other groups or infringing upon the rights of others.
From the lenses of political economy, violence in society is a product of irreconcilable
differences between the dominant and oppressed classes (Lubeck 1985). Capital is unre-
pentantly consumed with the drive to reproduce itself while labour, on the other side, is
fundamentally opposed to crude capital accumulation at the expense of workers’ welfare.
Within this premise, it is therefore the case that social conflict and violence will increasingly
break out in societies with scarce economic resources in which capital and labour compete
(Kukah 1993). In the Nigerian context, conflict is a manifestation of a power tussle, class
struggle, ethnic difference and religious tension between the North and South.
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Conflict and violence in Nigeria have resulted in unnecessary deaths, destruction and
suffering. Worse still, conflict threatens national unity. Especially in the north, religious
conflicts are usually a manifestation of deep-seated dissatisfaction with social and economic
realities of poverty and deprivation (Khan and Chen 2016). Conflict there often takes on a
religious colouration, even if the issue of contention is political or socioeconomic. Ethnic
disputes also take on religious camouflage. For instance, the Maitatsine riots of 1980 to
1984 in Kano, Bulunkutu near Maiduguri (1982), Rigasa in Kaduna (1982) and Jiemta near
Yola (1984) later assumed a measure of religious dimensions (Isichei 1987). Additionally,
the 2000 riots over the implementation of the Sharia legal code in Kaduna assumed ethnic
confrontation between the Hausa-Fulani and other ethnic groups, notably the Kajes, Katafs,
Ibos, and Yorubas (Olurode 1989). This suggests a direct link between religion and conflict
on the one hand while, on the other, it reveals a pattern of discernible regional suspicion
that had existed prior to independence in 1960. The combination of religion, ethnicity and
politics has constantly aggravated the mutual distrusts and the incessant ethnoreligious
violence and conflict that threatens Nigeria’s unity.
Independent Nigeria was founded on the principle of separation of church and state.
However, as politics became entrenched in ethnic sentiments and regional biases, violence
and conflict disrupted the gradual evolution of the political process. Contestation of politi-
cal power and access to state resources by politicians from different ethnic groups led to
the recruitment of religious leaders as means to an end— public support. Once recruited,
religious leaders used their platforms and engaged their followers by emphasising differ-
ences, especially religious differences. In this way, these clerics became significant catalysts
to violence, but not all violence is purely religious in nature (Adesoji 2011).
Religious leaders have used heated public rhetoric, such as the introduction of Sharia
laws and the ban of Christian Religious Studies (CRS) in secondary schools’ curricula.
These have led to an escalation of misunderstanding and a more divided, sectarian Nigeria.
While religion at present is one dimension of the problem, continued misuse of religion
as a tool to foster political, economic, or ethnic discord has increased sectarian hostility
across the region. A section of Muslims in the north such as the Maitasine uprising in Kano
in 1980 and Boko Haram are demanding that the Federal government implement Islamic
laws. They believe Nigeria should be founded on Islamic law, devoted to the teaching of
Islam. These religious sects constantly call on their fellow Muslims to rise up in rejecting
the conformist dogma that Nigeria is a secular state (Kendhammer 2013).
These sects are funded from abroad by countries who share their Islamisation agenda.
On their part, local clerics recruit from a bundle of unemployed youths to fight their
cause Loimeier (2012). Politicians on their part use their platform to drum up support
for extreme religious ideologies. These religious groups have grown dissatisfied with the
Nigerian political system, which they believe is too corrupt and too slow in promoting
their Islamisation agendas. The government’s failure in providing a means to livelihood
leaves the unsuspecting public with little option but to join and engage in suicide bombing
and extreme violence to threaten and paralyze the system. Keddie (1998) and Hasenclever
and De Juan (2007) argued that the politicisation of religion increases the risk of a violent
escalation of a conflict, which is principally rooted in political or socioeconomic problems.
5.2. Political Complicity and Religious Violence in Northern Nigeria
The factors that perpetuate recurring religious violence in northern Nigeria can be
grouped under three broad headings: historically embedded social divisions that mirror
religious and geographical division, political corruption and elite manipulation; and the
imposition of Sharia law in secular, constitutionally governed, democratic Nigeria. These
groupings are not mutually exclusive but overlap in fundamental ways in the Nigerian
context.
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5.2.1. Religion, Ethnicity, and Geographical Divide
In Nigeria, religion plays a crucial role in determining the trajectory of elections
and political relations. This is why the religion of a presidential candidate shapes the
dynamics of an election significantly. Religious differences between the North and the
South, particularly the juxtaposition of Muslim/Christian concentrations, has flared up
tensions in Nigeria’s political space. We argue that the ethnoreligious crisis that erupted
shortly after 1999 is symptomatic of the character and politics of the Nigerian state. At
the centre of most violence and conflict, we believe, is the problem of intolerant ethnic
sentiments and toxic religious views that lay at the foundation of intermittent outbreak of
violence within the north and along its boundaries with the Middle Belt.
At independence, nationalist leaders who emerged as state inheritors of power were
faced with widening inequalities between the north and south. Ethnic suspicions and
confrontations over resource control, revenue allocation and political leadership were not
only unresolved but, in more ways than one, threatened the very existence of Nigeria. As
Ochonu (2014) puts it, colonialism many not been the cause of inter-ethnic skirmishes, but
it worsened it as ethnoreligious politics—introduced during decolonisation in the 1950s—
festered and endured. For Osaghae (1988), the decision to force essentially incompatible
groups together under an unworkable system not only laid the foundation of political
suspicion and mistrust, but also proved costly after 1960. Independent Nigeria was
therefore internally divided along regional and religious lines. These issues escalated into
major political crises that prompted the first military coup in 1965, and subsequent coups
in 1966, the infamous Nigerian/Biafra Civil War (1967–1970) and more coups thereafter.
Identity politics, corruption, scarcity of opportunities and socioeconomic challenges
within the larger Nigerian system have inspired organised insurgency, especially in the
north. Although violence is more prevalent in the northeast, it is a reflection of the political
and social environment of the region. Especially in the north, there are complexities
involved in the interpretation of the concept of Islam and its central role in politics, ethnic
relations, and the resistance to foreign influence from the West. Religion is important
in politics to the extent that religious leaders operate as part of or at par with the ruling
elite. Clerics have vested interest in political power and are determined to collaborate with
politicians in maintaining control of the system. This observation highlights the connection
between politicians and religious leaders in the north as they mutually influence each other
in the national and regional political arena.
Although successive governments since independence attempted to forge a Nigerian
identity, each component part—East, West, Middle Belt and North—retained its unique
identity with moderate allegiance to a united Nigerian identity. When civil rule was re-
established in 1999, the ethnic and religious composition of each region did not change.
More than elsewhere, the north remained ethnically homogenous, united under a single
language, culture, religion, and spiritual head—The Sultan of Sokoto. Evidence indicates
that prior to and since independence, power brokers in northern Nigeria have deliberately
distanced themselves from Western influence through rhetoric, resistance to Western
education and rejection of Anglo-American civilisation. Through these resistances and
ensuing violence, elites in the north benefit from the promotion of ethnoreligious conflicts as
they seek to profit, politically, ideologically and strategically from the associated arithmetic
of numbers underpinning the conflicts, which may translate into increasing security votes,
contracts, the creation of local governments and/or states as well as swelling representation
in the National Assembly.
This study identified politicians as the main drivers of conflict and violence across the
north. Although more than one factor fuels conflict in the north, politics of who receives
what has become a catalyst that frequently fuels the growing sectarian violence and conflict
to a frightening magnitude. It could be argued, and rightly so, that the spate of conflict and
violence in northern Nigeria has its roots in the social and economic disposition, which have
helped to escalate the crisis to its present terrifying point. Most states in the north straddle
the country’s ethnic and religious divide, stemming predominantly from competition over
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political control, ethnic and religious grounds. Complicity works when vested interest in
political positions get sucked into the rhetoric associated with victory-at-all-cost politics.
This escalates to frightening proportions when personal financial gains mix with parochial
ethnic and regional interest.
A case in point was in 1965 when thugs were used to deal with political rivals in order
to perpetuate a certain group in power. All parties at the time played dirty politics—the
Northern People’s Congress (NPC) in the north, the National Council of Nigeria, and the
Cameroons (NCNC) in the east, the Action Group (AG) in the west. National elections that
year were the most violent in Nigeria’s political history, as elections were openly rigged
and ballot boxes were stuffed with extra ballot papers, culminating into widespread rioting
from October 1965 to January 1966. Political thugs from each party were all out to rob, loot,
burn and kill (Ebimboere 2017).
Similar conflict occurred in 1979, 1983, 1993 and, more recently, in 2007 and 2011
when political parties engaged the use of thugs to disrupt orderly democratic processes.
Certain religious sects across the north of Nigeria have become veritable obstacles to the
emergence of a truly democratic culture. Islam in the north is more than religion but a
radical ideology and a political identity. Those who do not identity with Islam and are of
southern origin are pushed so far as to steer clear of any political intentions within the
region. Non-Muslims have never occupied any significant political positions at any level
of government in the north.
5.2.2. Political Corruption, Manipulation and Complicity
Data from this study indicate that politicians engage in manipulating the populace,
using religion to create mistrust while seeking and perpetuating themselves in power. They
use their broad platforms to spread inflammatory statements and religious sentiments,
thus whipping up intolerance among their followers and agitating non-followers. This
tactic is used to polarise the public and create a “we-against-them” divide. We argue that
political elites will tender religious bids if religious legitimacy seems to be rational to secure
their own survival. This assertion highlights the role of political leaders in the context of
religious charging prior to, during and after elections. A case in point occurred in 2011
when supporters of Retired. General Mohammed Buhari who contested for and lost the
presidential election poured into the streets across the north to demonstrate, destroy and
terrorise non-supporters of their candidate, especially southerners living in the north. We
found no evidence of Mohammed Buhari calling for restraint or appealing to his followers
to exercise restraint.
De Juan (2009) argued that successful mobilisation, however, requires that politicians
find allies in religious leaders who share similar interests. This mutually beneficial re-
lationship requires politicians to promote and fund Islamic causes at the national and
regional level, while religious leaders on their part convince their followers, using political
interpretations that are likely to drum up support and win votes for certain politicians
on the one hand, while on the other hand, demonise others. Northern Nigerian has been
infected with religious chauvinism and exploitation by politicians and religious clerics
who have become the ideological hand maidens of an unjust social order, contrary to the
basic teachings of the Quran. Most clerics have downplayed their spiritual responsibilities
towards their followers in the race to acquire material wealth.
This has ignited debate over whether state governments should help prevent religious
violence by issuing licenses to preachers, thereby establishing norms that religious leaders,
such as Mohammed Yusuf, would have to adhere to in order to lead a congregation. While
this may seem to many Westerners like an infringement on free speech or an intrusion of
the state into religious affairs, Paden (2008) notes that there is a history of such licenses in
Nigeria, based on the argument that when a preacher “cries fire in a crowded (religious)
theatre”, their rights to “free speech” are no longer protected. Many northern governors
who should set up mechanisms to monitor preaching in order to have a better idea of when
conflicts are likely to occur are beneficiaries of the current system and may seek to preserve it.
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The spate of violence and consequent bomb blasts in the north is a tragedy, not
only because of the unnecessary loss of lives or wanton destruction of properties but
because it exposes the flaws of politicians and their religious enablers that constantly put
the safety and wellbeing of the region at risk in exchange for parochial, personal needs
(Bintube 2015). While ethnic and regional diversion between the north and south hides
the spiralling tragedies that occur across the three geopolitical zones in the north, it is
reprehensible that political and religious leaders are failing to protect and advance the
interest of their primary constituents.
It is equally interesting to note that in the north, the political class who are recipients
of modern scientific and technical education from the West push fundamentalist and
ideological philosophies that negate the uptake of Western education by the public. Rather
than promote enlightenment, they use religion to hold back the public on the one hand,
while on the other hand, they blame outsiders, particularly southerners and the West,
as enemies of the north. Politicians in the region therefore use religion to distract from
the critical task of state building and human development. It is no surprise that states in
northern Nigeria have the worst development indices nationally. The challenges of poverty,
food insecurity, mass illiteracy, youth unemployment and infrastructural development are
well documented in the literature (Lubeck 1986; World Bank 2020); yet, politicians, whose
families are Western-educated, call on a socio-economically backward, poorly educated,
malnourished and mostly disenfranchised pool of discontent citizens to reject Western
education and civilisation. They easily incite them to go on a rampage and resist change.
Evidence shows that some politicians induce an individual or group, by creating an
enabling environment for tensions to flare and violence to occur. In such cases, politicians
are straightforwardly causal modes of tensions and complications. Although, there are
other modes of complicity that facilitate the commission of violence; for example, when
the Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad, also known as Boko Haram, turned the
spotlight on the political elite and security agencies, revealing how their activities and
failings have undermined national security because the same authority recruited them for
their political gains; the leader of the group went further to implicate the sponsors. The
complicity of politicians and religious leaders to incite violence and terror have wreaked
significant havoc on the region.
“The truth is that politicians are the root cause of this Boko Haram problem. For
instance, in Borno State, the governor sponsors a group of armed youths known
as ECOMOG. It is this ECOMOG that the governor formed and looks after, above
the police, State Security Service and other security agencies. In Gombe State, the
governor has the Kalari. I was once contacted by a governorship candidate to
kill an opponent for a fee”. Aliyu Tishau, the sect co-founder and coordinator
in Gombe, Bauchi and Plateau states, 29 September 2011 Interview with Punch
Newspaper.
Some politicians even placed a stamp of validation on sectional conflict and violence
and intolerance with homicidal propensity in the name of religion. Politicians who have
associated with such religious conflict through inflammatory pronouncement and inciting
rhetoric have become the true sponsors of violent organisations such as Boko Haram. In
some sense, Boko Haram is not really about a detestation of Western or other forms of
education, but the expression of a malignant outcrop of fanaticism and intolerance.
Findings also demonstrate that at the extreme end of the spectrum, there is a section
of the elite in the north who emphasise involuntary Islamisation by taking over state
governance, including the take-over of state power by democratic or military means—a
holistic or totalitarian idea that combines religious and political order. The alliance between
religion and political authority has shifted to new dimensions by reason of incessant bomb
blasts evidenced by the attacks of June 16th 2011 on the national headquarters of the
Nigerian Police Force and the United Nation Building in Abuja of 26 August 2011, and
violent kidnapping of students for ransom. These have resulted in significant changes in
the north.
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5.2.3. Sharia Law in Secular Nigeria
Since 1998, religion-related, intercommunal violence in the north has resulted in
the death of thousands of people and many more thousands displaced, with numerous
churches, mosques, businesses, vehicles, private homes and other facilities burnt and
destroyed. The most severe incidents have occurred in the Middle Belt region including
Jos, Plateau State (September 2001, November 2008, January 2010, March 2010, December
2010, and January–April 2011); Bauchi State (January 2011); Kaduna State (February and
May 2000 and November 2002); Kano State and Yelwa, Plateau State (February–May 2004);
and Northern and South-eastern Nigeria (February 2006). Additionally, clashes between
herders and farming communities continued in the Middle Belt in Jos and Benue. Conflicts
over the role of religion in politics and society have emerged in at least twelve Northern
states including Zamfara, Sokoto, Kano, Niger, and Adamawa states.
In 1999–2000, the establishment or re-emergence of Sharia law (Islam’s legal system
derived from the Koran, the life of prophet Muhammad (SAW), and fatwas—the rulings
of Islamic scholars) in secular, democratic Nigeria has its roots in the 1980s and 1990s
when proposals were made to the National Assembly—Nigeria’s highest law-making
institution—to establish the Federal Sharia Court of Appeal. Though these attempts
failed, the idea survived. With Sharia, most northern states continued to mix religion and
politics without clear-cut delineation. Violence inspired by religion thereafter became an
intractable crisis. Sharia became the weapon with which political and radical Muslim elites
used to institutionalise suspicion, hatred, division, and antagonism against non-Muslims
within the region. Sharia’s imposition also emboldened fanatics and gave legitimacy to
Islamic fundamentalism. We believe that Sharia laid the foundation for the radical, violent,
anti-government campaign of Boko Haram that took off in August 2009 when the group
attacked police stations near the town of Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state, setting off
days of fighting, leading to loss of lives and destruction of properties.
What Sharia also symbolises is an ideology that legitimises a tradition of violence,
war and Jihad against infidels—non-Muslims. Although Islam is proclaimed as peaceful, it
endorses the use of force and aggression for its self-preservation and expansion. Violence
thus becomes a form of acceptable practice in Islam. This suggests that the problem of Islam
goes much deeper than a contradiction between theory (proclamations of peace) and prac-
tice (endorsed violence), but instead, a conflict between two important and fundamental
aspects of the religious: one part treats peace as holy, while the other endorses violence as
holy. There is a deep connection between authoritarian religion and authoritarian politics.
It is rare for someone who promotes authoritarian politics to accept democracy in their
religion or for someone who promotes authoritarian religion to fully accept democratic
politics. Problems arise, however, when these same people assert claims to social and
political power, which they would then employ to push the same choices on the rest of us,
whether implicitly or explicitly.
Findings indicate that the real reason for politically motivated violence is not ethnic or
religious differences but the scramble for land, scarce resources, and political clout. Poverty,
joblessness, and corrupt politics drive extremists from both sides to commit horrendous
atrocities. The emergence of Boko Haram (with ties to Al Qaeda) can also be understood
from the deprivation and poverty framework. Boko Haram—which literally means “West-
ern education is forbidden”—was mostly comprised of dissatisfied young people and
unemployed university students and graduates (Khan and Chen 2016). Accordingly, this
reflects the general frustration at the grassroots level, especially among semi-educated
youth who feel frustrated and disenfranchised.
The ideologists of Boko Haram reject the division of Nigeria into modern states.
To them, the only boundaries that matter are between Islam (of which they believe
they are the only authentic representatives that dictates the code for ruling the
nation) Josiah Idowu-Fearon, Bishop of the Anglican Diocese of Kaduna (2012).
In northern Nigeria, the form of modernisation being pushed on the public by the
political and religious elite is significantly different from the realities of the “elites”. While
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the former is tied to radical Islam, the latter are beneficiaries of secular institutional privi-
leges, state power and Western education. Nowhere else in modern Nigeria are the battle
lines between modernity and religious tradition so starkly complicated in sharp contrast
with much less confusion about the roles of the state, the rhetoric of the powerful elite
and the experience of the masses. This suggests that in the north, religious radicalisation
and confrontational violence and conflict are the exclusive preserve of the public, while
modernity and liberalisation are the privileges of the upper class. Inevitably, violence and
conflict across the northern states has denied liberal “Muslim” people the choice of being
less extreme to explore different ways to be Muslim.
6. Conclusions and Recommendations
This paper highlighted the roots and drivers of radical Islam and insurgency in
Northern Nigeria. It emphasised and linked three fundamental factors for recurring
conflict—historically embedded social, economic, and geographical issues within the larger
Nigerian context; political corruption and manipulation in the north; and the imposition of
Sharia Law in selected states in northern Nigeria. Three other issues are subsumed within
the broader factors—first, the presence of aggrieved, uneducated and dislocated masses
who feel disenfranchised and economically disempowered; second, religious leaders and
clerics—enablers of the political class and ideological defenders of Islam; and finally,
multidimensional poverty, lack of opportunities and infrastructural decay.
At the national level, competition for political relevance is linked to regional and
religious insulation from external influences in the north. Suspicions of others have been
allowed to fester over the years and will continue to create new vistas for tension and
possibly violence. The complicity of politicians will exacerbate tension in the violence-
prone areas. The type of violence, conflict, and terrorism in northern Nigeria, by and large,
does not discriminate in its choice of target. It attacks men and women of whatever political
(or apolitical) views, social class, and walk of life—young and old, adults and children. No
matter what their sources, political, religious, or economic, frequent conflict and violence
in the north will continue to set the region and country back.
The Federal Government of Nigeria should create an education forum that would
help people draw from the past without being enslaved to it. Public awareness campaigns
should be geared towards promoting tolerance and a valuing of diversity, without which
the region and country would continue its descent into chaos and conflict. To secure
Nigeria’s future and forestall violence, crisis and conflicts, the government must create
space and opportunities for people to realise their full potential and aspiration. The rising
spectre of youth unemployment is a stark reality that may continue to haunt Nigeria. The
need to address these issues seriously and concertedly at all levels of governance with all
the urgency it deserves must become the priority for current and future administrations.
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